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r; v; 1 No . 1 9 2 2 4 
Respondents, w;111am nean Poqers and Patricia ~eD Rogers, 
'iled this action to quiet their title to two ~uildinq lots which they 
ourchased from certain of the r1efendants anc1 for r'lamages resulting fron• 
delays in constructing the subr1ivision roac'ls, water system anr'l other 
unorovements. 
DJSPOSI"'Il)~l H 1 "'HE f.OWE~ rollR'l' 
'l'he case was triec'I before the f-lonorable Homer P. ~ilkinson 
0 ittinq without a ;urv, on responc'lents' claims aqainst aope1lant, M. o. 
0 itner Co., anc'l c'lefendants, P1aine B. Pitner, Westcor, Inc., Douglas 
•onson and John s. Davis. Pesoondents were unable to locate defendant 
0 ichard Johns so he was not served or made a partv to the action. 
0 rior to trial, the rourt enterec'I r1efault iudgment in favor of the 
~spondents against r1efenr1ants P. Alonzo Badaer and Utah Security 
~Ortgaae, cn(l Settlement • ..;as r~,:'.i('rf:?~ Wit~ ,-'JpFpr~::irt-:· ~rn ' 1 •:..-;l--,, r'-,,.., 
Responrlents' c~a~m acainst ~pfen~Art ~0hr c. r3v;~ ~·~~ 1 ,~ 
to a rec or c e c 11. s s i an men t of r o ri t r act n n "'a r" "f th 0 1 0 t s i r "' ~ j r 1. '·' • 
Davis was the nameo assiqnee. IPxh. i 7P ann i 3P\ 
responcents' title as to those encumhrances. 
and 2e, R. 7q4). 
Followina trial anc two anrlitional hParinas concerninq ac~· 
lant's obiections to proposed Findinas oF Pact ann ronclusior~ ;-,f T?> 
the rourt enterect ~udament in favor of the responc"ents aaainst thg 
appellant anc' aefenoants Westcor, Tnc., Douglas Monson, F. ll. 1 onzn 
Badger anc' ntah Securitv Mortqaqe, iointlv and severallv, in the to';' 
sum of SS!i,'122.57, anr quieten responrlents' title to their two lots 0' 
several recorc"ec claims ana encumbrances. No nefenrlant but M. n 
Bitner Co. has appealed this iudgment, af'n its appeal is Jimitec' to >"p 
award of money damages. 
Separate claims asserted bv nefenoant Haroln H. Bennett 
against the appellant and other oefennants were 1 itigaten at the same 
time. Those claims were niFferent from those of resoondents Willia~ 
and Patricia Rogers anc' resulted in a separate iuoqment. (No issue 
relating to that iuogmPnt will be ctiscusserl in this brief since rPsor"· 
dent Bennett will be fili.na his own brief.\ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPPAL 
Respondents request that this rourt affirm th<> .Tuclgment ,,r' 
trial court in aJl oarticul 2rs and awarrl rPsponrlents t'1ei r costs ,nr 1 
-2-
::>pconnr1 !'?rit~ ri~crJut-P t- ~~ 3DDP 11 ant's stat:err~nt 0F Fncts as rot 
~eina P~ther accur~t~ nr ro~nl~tP, 3n~ ~ccnr~~ng1~,, aoo~~,ants offer 
'~ei r own stciterrient of facts cis foll 0v": 
Tn 1978 tfie appc>llant wa:3 the sole title owner of certain real 
property located in Summit C'ountv, TJtah, which it clPcided to develop 
into a resiclential suhdivision containina 65 lots. ('T'. 127) Pre1imi-
iarv aPproval of the subdivision Plat was aranted by Summit rounty in 
about F<?hruary, l Q7R. ~,, ~riat remained for final aoprova·· 
--which was required before anv 1 ots coulcl be offered for sale--was 
8roof of financing to construct the subdivision irriprovements such as 
thP roads, water syst"'m, and the 1 i k<?. 'T'o that Point in time, all wor1 
~acl been undertaken by the apPel1ant alone. ('T', l 26-128; R. 7F.6-767l 
Before and after preliminary approval for the subdivision pla 
was grantecl, the aPPellant hacl discussions with various Parties about 
the Pnssibilitv of Participating in the development. l'T'. 128\ 'rhese 
ieootiations were prompted at least in part by difficulties the appel-
1ant had encountered in raising funds to construct the subdivision 
i'11provements on its own. ('T'. ?36, R.'67\ 
On or about ~ovember 1, ]Q78, appellant signed an agreement 
•ith rlefendant Westcor cnncernina the subdivision development. (T. 
'2Q, 26:?-263) 'T'he agreement was written uo as a Dniform Real Estate 
"ontract with several arlditional paaes titled "Exhibits" olus another 
~oe c>ntitled ·~upplemental Agreement" which was apparently added at 
30me unknown 1 ater rJate. (Fxh. nPl 'T'he parts of this agreemen~ which 
-3-
as lona term capjtal aains insteail of nrrinarv ;ncnmP. 
2i;~-237; p 7h7-768\ 
'T'he purchase price for tbe lane' was baser on an anticiC'atP'" 
share of the proceeds from sale of the improver 1ots. I"'. l'.\7\ l\Jl 
parties acknowledge that the $400,000 stated in the contract was sub-
stantiaUv higher th-an the market value of the undeve1ooe<"1 land. rm 
137, R. 768) 
"'he pavment terms merelv stateri the $400,000 Principal ?m"'l", 
No down Payment was requireo and no interest was charaeil on tre unoai,' 
balance. Nor was anv minlmum periodic oayment reauried. 
contract sPecifieo a !!!_~rnU!!!_ annual payment, which was taken fr0m the 
reauirements of feoeral tax law for treating income as lona tPrm caoi-
tal gains. '!'he aPPel1ant was entitle(! to either one-half of the incor" 
from lot sales or assignment of executed Jot sale contracts as oavme~' 
for its share of the development. 
Principals of the appelJant were express 1v autliorizeil to off 0 • 
lots for sale ano were entitled to a four Percent commission for anv 
solo. 'T'he sub-iect property is ac11acent to the I-1 c; Preewav and certa•" 
Principals of the aope1lant placea a billboarr on the suhdivision 
property facing the freewav which advertiser lots for sale anr 1 iFta~ 
those oersons' phone numbers to call for information. I"' 69, 1411, 
204; Fxh. 19) '!'his hillhoarc1 was erecter Prior to the time t"e 'r>t 
sales began and the appellant's principals eventuallv so1a nearlv Gn•-
-4-
~'1ir nF t-rp sixt--»1 -f;1;c:. lnt-::- ;r t-h~ ~Uh~i1;i::-irir (m. )1(:)
1 
for wbich 
~i--p·,: ·' 0 rr:. :1:-ii;l ?;jll'.7::: ["()fT'<ni"::c-irinc:: ~+- rnrrr- +::h,'.:\r ¢1?,()()n r=l•_irina the three 
-:-r,\.- r-' 1-::J r- ·,r r 1n70 
~efendant westc0r w~ 0 rgsonrsihle un0er the contract For 
:rrGnainq tre fil'"'lcncinri tn cnn~t--r-1Jct t-hp ~uhc-livi~ion impr0vemPnts (,,.,. 
132) an0 for suoervisjnq their installation. "'he contract acknowledqed 
that Summit ~ountv estimated the construction exoense at $?84,400 and 
orovided that the apoellant was entitled to one-half of any savings if 
''estcor coul n comol ete tre i moro,1ements For less. ('T'. 1 4 0; p. 7 i; Q) 
,,.inally, the contract reauirea Westcor to complete construc-
tion of tre subdivision improvements ~1~hin one year FolJowina execu-
tion of the aoreement. '"'· 200, :?fi'i; P. 7r:;9) 
Aooroximatelv nine navs after the aoreement with westcor was 
signed, the apPel lant signed an 1"scrow Fund Aqreement IFxh. 24P) that 
was filed with ~ummit Countv For the Puroose of obtaininq final 
approval of the subdivision plat. "'his aqreement stated that the sum F 
5284,400 had been deposited with oefennant Utah Security Mortqage in a~ 
account assigned to Summit County to guarantee completion of the subdi-
vision improvements. 'T'he agreement also required that the subdivision 
improvements be completed within twentv-four months. 'T'he appellant 
alone is named in and sianed this document as the developer. 
?02; R. 7r:;9) 
IT. :?01-
Mo funds or account ~s reoresenteo in the Escrow 1"und Aqree-
ment ever existed. (R. 770) 
More than two months after the aqreement with Westcor was 
siqned, the appellant signed and recorded the 0 rotective Covenants of 
-~-
the subr'ivision. 
Pxceot For S("'lme rraterialc that Y.l~rc-; n.".:l;~ rr'Y :-,, • ... ,,:-1--rrir, j' 
construction of t1:-'ie sub~lvision ; rnornvPi:n°nt:: was oorf'JrmPrl ~"' ,i r<·T' 
owne<1 and operateii ':iv P'aine P. Pitner, tli" ,oino"''ant'c or"s'rlPnt, 
bv others under contract w'th the appe 1 lant. 
Additionally, the entire development Proceer'ec1 complete 1 v in acc0rr1a~c" 
with the plans prePare<'l bv the apPel lant before Westcor becam<> invol•10' 
in the proiect. IR. 760) 
Jn F'ebruary, 1980, certain parties !none of whom ar<> involvo,.; 
in this action\ who liad purchaseri lots in t:he subr'livision hrouqht <cu,· 
in the mhird District: rourt For qummit rountv tit 1 et'I ~im rvnn, ,,. a'. 
v. Westcor, et al. (~ase No. c;qgc;). None of the resoonrients herein 
were parties to that action, but r1efenr1ants included noua 1 as Monson, 
the apoellant and the appellant's president, Blaine P. Pitner. 
action involved the same facts as in tlie instant case includina al 1 eoa-
tions of fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the non-
existent account described in the aforementioned Escrow F'und Agreemeo: 
John Vavis reoresented all of the defendants named above in the Lynn 
case and in the instant case. In direct contraciction to its positiM 
in the instant case, the appellant in~ has consistently acknow-
ledged that it was responsible for financing anr1 installing the subrli-
vision improvements. Additionally, the apoellant has never asserter' 
Lynn that it was merely a seller of the land. I~. 770\ 
The appellant has never filed a cross-claim against WPstcor 
('!'. 226-228), and in the four vears that have elaoser1 between the f< 
hearing in Lynn and this appeal, the appellant lias never oh;ect"" t(' 
-F.-
l(\ ) !) u f1 
ni::>w 3.0r'PP.rppnt c-nri~ri r n ~ " 1 .::: t hp ::;1il)r-1; ·: i c: l nn rp1;pl ooment ~nt i tlecl "'T'rust 
?arties c1urinq the precec11ng sevPral montlis. Jn tliis aareement the 
JDpellant express 1 v acsurnPc1 sole anc1 comolete resoonsibilitv for the 
subdivision development and completion of the subdivision imprnvement,. 
?10-211, ?10-?tl; P 771) "'he ilODPl'cint also agreE>d to hold defen· 
•ants ~estcor and noualas Monson harmless from any liability arising 
1ut nf the su~c1ivision ~Pvelnornent. !'T'. 211; P.7'711 T!'1 exchanae, 
~estcor assianec1 to the aPoellant any and all interests !t lielc1 in 
certain lot salp contracts and denosits. qhnrtlv afterwards, Westcor 
executed assionments on each of the listed contracts to attorney John 
navis as 'T'rustee for thP appel iant and also executec1 documents revokin· 
orior assianments of the contracts. 'T'he '!'rust Agreement was revokab1e 
if Westcor did not cooperate in recovering tlie contracts it was to 
assign to the appellant in which event all assignments made to the 
appellant or John Davis as 'T'rustee were to be assianed hack to Westcor 
'lo such contract has been assigned back to Westcor ('T'. ?2Q, 3c;1) and 
'coth Blaine ti. Bitner, the aopellant's president, anc1 Douglas Monson, 
'•lestcor's principal officer testifiec'! at trial that t:lie '!'rust Agreement 
•as and hac'! continuous 1 y been in Fu11 force and effect. 
1c;1 \ 
('1'. 230-231' 
Neither the aopellant nor anyone associatec'! with it had any 
?rior c1ealings or acauaintance with Westcor or anv of its princioa 1 s. 
Prior to sionlna tr~ ~10veTT1ber 1, 107p ,-::iarPP'1l0l""\t 1,:it-J...,, r.'0c:t-r:-,--..y, 1-\.,p 
apoel~ant rPcrueste~ no informatin~ AhnLJ+- ·· 7 A~~cnr ~r it-~ ~r;nr;~~ 1 c: 
ahout how westcor was ~r~ancina Fnr t~e fi~~nci ..... n Fny +-h0 =~h~i·;i-
imorovements. ("'. 1 ~0-11".l) P..n i nvestia.1t i0r. ..,.10u1~ hcvP rp11~c:i 1 f:?ri +-h; 
westcor did not even exist--it was eventua1lv incnroorateri morP thcr 
two months later in January, I 0 7a. When it was formerl, westcor ha~ 
onlv the statutory minimum of $1,000 caoital. ('1'. 266l ~1 eitl-ie• ~·r 
Monson nor any other principal associatecl witr Westcor haa a bac~grour' 
in real estate development or financina nor any oersonal assets to 
contribute towarcl Westcor's obl iaations under the contract with the 
aooell ant. IR. 771-772) 
Resoondent ~illiam nean Poqers is a 1 icenserl General ron-
tractor who does business as~. Dean Roqers and Son ronstructin~ ro~-
oany. ('1'. J 5-1 6l Resoondent Patricia Lee Rogers is his wife and 
assists in tre business. (T. l (;) During the times pertinent to th;' 
case the resoondents were primarily invo 1 vea in "spec buiJrlina" resi-
dential homes, which means the resoondents would select a buildinq 
site, arrange for financina, construct tl-ie borne then sell it on the 
ooen market, hopeful 1 y for a profit. ('1'. l Ii). 
Respondents purchased two imoroved lots in the suboivision 
involved in this case. riosina t0ok place in April, 1070, and resoon-
dents received a Warranty need to each lot: whicr namer" Westcor, Tnc." 
the seJ ler. ('1'. 17, 24-25: R. 772: "'xh. J,7) 
'T'he resoondents first contactec the sellers' real Pstate aaE'' 
about purchasing the lots in ,Januarv, i 0 79. ('1'. l 7) A few ravs l at 0 • 
they visited the subdivision site but it was covered with snow so the 
-R-
~r- 1 1 '..:i ,-ri '~0P '::'11? 1 r..t- 10r,FJf"r!r--; frr-,m :::i rlist~TlCP ?:1~ COUlrl rot See the 
n 1_1 r ~ ,., CT ':: I- "::. '- , ; . c ; t- 1-- ,~ c ; !:: P ~ n rl :::i t n t 0 e r t: i rn C: 8 D r i Cl r t O 
;:- 10si no, thi=? rPsonrrl,orit-s stator1 '::r. thP ~pl 1 Prs' aaent that thev in-
""nr1Pn to rui 1(1 hn'"PS nn thp +-wn 'nts '"hi ch woul(l he cffereCl for sale 
as soon as they were comp'eted. I"'. 21, ??, l.'~, 19, ]72-176) 
responnents also explaineCl +-hat the houses could not be offered for 
sale until the subnivision improvements were completer so thev needed 
to ~now what imcrnvements were to he out in and when they would he 
'4one. ("' 18, ?2, 21) '"h" re~' Psta'::P aoent- reel ier that the cevel-
ooers wouJn crovirP a water svstpm, sewpr c'PPS, caver roans and a11 
utilities. ('1'. J 60' 
represented' were t:.o 
J 71, 27, 73) All of these imcrovements, 
he comcleter hefore the enr of ~q7q. I"'. 
the agen 1 
l 73' 
174' 2 3) "'he aoent's information came nirectlv from defennant Douqlas 
Monson who authorized the aoent to make those representations to per-
spective lot purchasers. I"'. 168, 170, 765) "'he real estate agent in 
turn directly informed Westcor anr Douqlas Monson about the resoon-
dents' clans to construct homes during the uocomino summer before the 
respondents closed on the lots. l'T'. 175 - 1 7 E ; P. 7'.' 3) 
Tn orner to purchase the lots and construct the homes, the 
cesconnents obtainen a construrt•on loan from Prudential Federal 
~avings in the aporoximate principal sum of $160,000. l'T'. 7J) This 
loan reauired no monthlv oayments but was nue and pavahle in full ten 
~onths later, which was about Januarv, lOflO. l'T'. 48; P.773) 
Resconcents beoan constructing a house on each lot in June, 
l'T'. <3; P. 773) A short time later work on the subdivision 
_q_ 
imorovements heaan which consiste~ of ex~Av~ti0~ f0r w~t0r ~n~ ~n~1~y 
lines and a rouqh cut nf the roads. 
summer work on the subdivision imorov 0 ments stnnoP~. 
the road bed had been scraped out but not qravelPd or paved an~ t~0 
excavations for the sewer and water oipe lines werP still nnt cn~­
pleted. Construction of the water reservoir and oumoinq station for 
the water system hail not begun and no ut i 1 it ies had been hrouaht int' 
the subdivision. ('!'. 43-44) No further work was done on these im-
provements during 1979. Jn the following year, 1080, the excavation 
ann installation of the water lines was completed. r'onstruction of, 
reservoir and pump house for the water system, and the aravel ino anr 
paving of the roads, were not begun until after the November 1, 1080 
r'leadline specified in the F,scrow Fund Aareement. f'T'. 41'; Pxh. 17, ?R, 
20) 'T'he water svstem was finally completeil in the "pring of 1081, anc' 
the roads were finally gravelefl and pave<'l in the Summer of ias1. 
Respondents coulil have finished construction on their two 
houses iluring J 070 but ha] tea their work at a point where the houses 
could survive the weather when it became apnarent the subdivision 
improvements would not be comp1eter'l in time for the winter season. 
(R. 773) 
'T'he work done on subdivision imProvements during ig70 was 
performed bv a company owned and ooerateil by defendant Blaine Bitner, 
the appellant's President. ('T'. 140) l"r. Bitner was freauentl v on tf:p 
site when the work was being done and most of the work was Clone bv '"' 
under the direct supervision of Mr. Bitner's son. 
homes were plainly visible from everv ooint in the suhflivision anr sr,m, 
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Dl:iinc-. n;t-1~r t:i::.:-:t->fip? t-h0+:: l~,p vic:itPG thf:> sitps oF 
' \-"') •' +- :,. 1 (' h nm p ,...,, "n C" r· '.' <'.;l .,.- 1 l n .-~ 0 __ , c ' "0 c:: 0 ,...- i rl r- t- r "!:- 1 l 0 IJ c t- ? 0 , l 0 7 0 t 0 see h 0 Vl 
(aoi r~ v r~sn0nrlPnt v 1 .::i~ nrn0rPsc i no 0r. +-he consttuct ion. 
'rat least nnp ncccesi0ri in 10 7°, ,1pFpnr>;,nt BlainP Pitr>er anr respon-
oent William nean Roaers hara conversation at the construction site 
~urina which Ritner stated thP improvements would be completed before 
'•inter set in. ("'. 17-18' c;4 \ 8Painning in the qummer of 197Q after 
work nn the imornvPments had stnnnPr, the resoondents contacted defen-
•an• Rlaine Bitner, othPr reprPSP~t3tives of the apoellant and repre-
sentatives of refendant ~Ps•cor on •everal occ8sions to notiFy them 
that the respondents' construction loans were coming due or were past 
~ue ar>C' cnu 1 d on'v ~e oaid ~v salp of the houses, which could not be 
sold because the subdivision improvements wpra not completed. ('T', 5 'i-
'7\ qespondents were rPoeatPrlv assured bv all of these oarties that 
work on the subdivision improvements would begin again and be complete, 
within a s'iort time. I"'. c; c;; R. 77 4) 
'T'he subdivision improvements could have been fullv constructed 
in 107° ("'. 147), and when they were not, thev could have been com-
Pleted during the Summer anr Fall of 1Q80. (P. 7741 
When the respondents' construction loans came due in January, 
\Q80, resoondents requPsted and were arantPd a thre€ month extention by 
r~e lenc1er. ("'. 48-40) When the new due date arrived and the respon-
1ents were still unable to oav the loans in full, the 1 ender required 
conversion of the loans to thirtv vear installment mortoages which 
carried pavments of more tran $2,0011 oer m0nth. ('T', 4()-t;Q) 'T'he re-
-11-
SPOndentS Were not able to make theSP month 1 v O~VmPnts '•nm +:hni • 
r!'>gular income anr> .sn had to tak!'> seoara'= 0 h;in!< lc,.3ns anr> +:'-or"-,.,,, 
From relatives to ~Peo the pavments currPnt. ('T'. " 1 \ 
could borrow no more ann fell into arrears in the "'all nf iaRn. 
50-51) In approx!matelv ~ovember or December, laRn, thp rosoonrlp•tc 
received notice from the lender of its intent to foreclose its secur1· 
interest in the two properties. ('1'. t:;]; Pxb. l 5, 1 ,:;; R. 775) 
Because of the continuing financial burden, the respondents 
substantially completed construction on the homes and placed them for 
sale in the Summer of 1080. Durino that time the responclents continu' 
to receive assurances from the appellant's representatives, oarticu-
larly John Davis, that construction on the subdivision improvements 
would commence and be completed soon. l'T'. 5 c:;) J n .1 u l v , 1 ° 8 0 , an 
Earnest Money Agreement was sioned on one lot sPecifying a sale price 
of $130,000 hut provider that closing would not take olace until toe 
subdivision improvements had been completed. Tn about September, an 
Earnest Money Agreement was signeo on the other lot for essential 'Y t'' 
same terms as the first. ('!'. 58-61; P.xb. 8, a) As 1<.Tovember 1, i 0 so, 
came anr1 passed, the homes remained uninhahitahle fnr lack of water a~ 
oenerallv unaccessible during wet weather over the ungraveled dirt 
roi'\ds. (R. 775) 
When Prudential Federal Savings threatene0 foreclosure in 1 3'' 
1980, the respondents contacted the parties who had signen the earli 0 r 
Earnest Money ~greements and other parties whom thev thought mioht ~ 0 
interested anr1 offered to sell the houses for a discount tn avoirl 
foreclosure and anv injurv to their credit rating. In ahout "Pcemhe 
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:i, r 1 i P : r • r r; P .ct- ,~on ° '/ /\cir Pr> rr en t c • 
i.::.nt~ fnr ;:1ll ti.~ir nut-nf-rJ(J(-Vr::'t- rn?tc, an~ ri2su'T'le a.11 risk concernina 
~orrplPt:i0n nf t:h~ sul-rli,;ici0n irnr•!·0vPrrients -::in~ ntr~r nrnhlems exceot 
'0r cl ear i no tl-ie resPonrlents' tit 1 P 0f sevPra1 sPur ious encumbrances. 
IR. 77F.) This amounted to a sum substantially lower than the 
'130,000.00 originallv offered in the earlier F:arnest Money AgreementL 
The buvers assumed the construction ioans and Paid the arrear 
iaes current bPqinninq in ,Tanuarv, 1081. Tn that same month, resPon-
•ents hirerl an exPPrt ornpertv aPnraiser tn rletermine what the full 
~ar~et value of each pr0Pertv woulrl h?ve been jf the subdivision im-
orcvements had been completed, SJ3F,OOO ano $138,000 were the sums 
1etermined by the aporaiser. I"'. 150-151; Exh. 25-26\ Lost profits 
were calculaterl by oerlucting the balance owed on the loans, the amount! 
oaid to tl-ie respondents for their out-of-pocket expenses, and other 
setoffs al lowed bv the Court from the appraised values. m. 776) 
APGUMFNT 
THF. P.VJ DF:tWF: PRESSN"'ED A"' Tp IAT, ("LFAPL Y F:STABL ISPFD 
A J0IWJ' VEN"'TJPP BP"'WEFN 'T''-!E l\PPF.LI.Atl'T' AND DF,F'F'NDAN'T' 
WFS'T'COP, INC. 
The trial court exPresslv found that the appellant had engaaed 
in a ioint venture with defendant westcor concerning the subdivision 
1eveJ opment. IConcJ us ion of Law No. 5, P. 78F-787). This case was 
'.ried to the Court sitting without a iurv. on review, this Court 
ihould sustain tl-ie rlecision below if it was based on findings supported 
'V substantial evic1ence, Gibbons 2nd qeerl ComPanv v. Guthrie, l 23 Ut. 
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of Law together with the supporting recorr shows that cuhstant'a' 
evidence of a ioint venture between the apoellant and defendant ~Ps>"c 
was presented at trial. 
~his Court defined the primary components of a ioint ventur" 
in Bassett v. Baker, s3n P.2n 1 rut. 1Q74l as follows: 
Id. at 2. 
A ioint venture is an aareement hetween two o• more 
persons ordinarilv but not necessarilv l imiterl to a 
single transaction for the ouroose of makina a 
profit. ~he reauirements for the relationship are 
not exactlv defined, hut certain elements are 
essential: ~he oarties must combine their property, 
money, effects, skill, labor and knowlerlge. As a 
general rule trere must be a community of interest 
in the performance of the common purpose, a ioint 
proprietary interest in the subiect matter, a mutua' 
riqht to control, a riaht to share in the orofits, 
an~ unless there is an -agreement to the contrarv, a 
dutv to share any losses which mav be sustained. 
When the evidence is conflicting as to whether a ioint ventur~ 
was intendeCl, this rourt, in Strand v. Cranney, 607 P.2d /Q<; rnt. 1°8r·, 
has stated: 
Whether a ioint venture exists deoends orimarilv 
upon the facts of a particular case rather than uoon 
adherence to specific formalities [citation ommiterll. 
As stated in Andews v. !'lush, lOQ <'al. Apo. <;11, 
517, 2°< P. 1'07, 1<;4 (lQ30}: 
~he law reauires little formality in the crea-
tion of a ioint adventure fcitation omitterll_ 
Such an aqieement is not invalid because nf 
indefiniteness in respect to its details ... 
In considering whether or not a relationshio 
such as that of ioint arventurers or oartners 
_, '1-
ha~ h0nn rrnA~P~, ~hp cn1)rr~ ~re aui~e~, not 
"n 1 ' 1 r \J rho c- on k- P fl Or 1.7 r ~ rt-pr w 0 r 0 S OF th P 
r 0 n t- r· 1,. t- i fl('] "l .::i r \-- ; r=> c: , h, •J t- ;, l s n h ·' t !--. 17 i r Cl.ct S • 
T f-1 , 0 t ") O (:, - ~ (:) 7 
ever intended or agrPerl upon wit~ thP rPspondPnts. mhjs rourt aFfirmerl 
the trial court's finding that the oarties had been engaged in a joint 
venture because: 
. nesPite possible misunderstandings as to the 
detcli ls, thP Parties C"onrlucted their dealings in a 
manner consistent w!th a ~oirt venture. ~he intent 
of the partiPs was t0 rle3l 1,1ith rthe assets of the 
venturei in a mannPr ronsistPnt with a mutual enter-
orise. 
ra. at 2°7. 
In cases invo1vina claims bv third oarties, an additional rul, 
has been aopJ ied which states that a ioint venture 3areement ". 
will be determined from the facts r3ther than the conclusions of the 
co-partners as to the nature of their business relationship." 
~~E.£~~.':'...!..__~D. so D., 3 3 r; P. ;> d B c; 4 , s c; 9 , s 5 Ar i z. 2 8 o IJ a 5 a) . 
In the instant case, the trial court had to decide whether the 
agreement between the appellant and Westcor was a simple sale of the 
land or a ioi nt venture. ~he onlv Proper way this decision could be 
made under the standards and tests described above was by considering 
the terms of the apPellant's various agreements and the appellant's 
ictions pursuant to the aareements. Tf the terms described a de facto ----
ioint venture then the Court made no error in finding the appellant a 
10int venturer with ~estcor, at least with respect to third-partv 
claims. Tn this reaard it is important to note that the aopellant 
~ever denied agreeing to the terms noted bv the rourt as the bases for 
-1 S-
its finrling oF a ~oint venture. 
ioint venture is the terms hv which Westcor ohtainerl t••lerl tn •~e 
l ano. Both Blaine R. Bitner, t>ie ar>PP1lant's orP~ic'ent, circ1 nnuqlo' 
Monson, the principal officer of Westcor, acknowlerlaerl that t>ie 
$400,000 purchase price was actuallv a percentage of the anticioaterl 
gross proceeds from the sale of improveo Jots in the comoleterl subrliu, 
sion. l'lonson saic it represetnea a 60-40 split ('T'. 277), Bitner a so-
50 split. ('!'. 1 3 7, 1 3 q, /3 2- 2 3 'i) Either way, it was a share of thp 
profits. ("'. 271' ?72) "'he terms bv which apppllant was tn hp oaic1 
for its share are founo in one of the manv "exhibits" to the form 
Uniform Real Fstate Contract and Provic'le that apoellant was entitlec'l • 
a portion of the Jot sale contracts or fiftv Percent of all pavments 
received on lot purchases after derluctions for sales commissions an~ 
closing costs. As such, debts would accrue to the appellant nn'v as 
lots were solc'I. In the interim there was no other minimum pavrnent or 
interest on the unpaid balance. 
The contract did specify maximum annual pavments that wpre 
stated as a percentage of the total proceeds from lot sales in anv 
year. "'he appellant acknowledged that this rather unusual Provision 
was included for tax purposes. 'T'he appellant's accountants har ac'lvise~ 
it to structure the transaction like a sale so the income coulrl be 
rePorterl as capital gains. ('!'. l 30, 27fi) "'he maximum annual oercPn-
tage was taken from IRS requirements for reporting long term caoi•e' 
gains. 
Other provisions of the agreement providerl for increase~ in 
1- 1.; r l '."Jr 0 1 1 -; r. I- 1 :::. ch 2 r P I! fl .-1 n r "0 r'" t- ~ ; :"' ,--. 1 r I' I] rr ';::' t 3 r C PC:: • 
1JrPr>fnP'1t- Qrni;irlPcl 1-1,~t- ;F f,Jccl-(--c-...- ',•):~c- ;::i~lt:: t-n );-istaJ1 ti,P SUh~iViSjOfl 
1 rr'Dr0 11P'.T1r->rts f0r 1 P:ss +-IJ.ar ~um!"f1 it- ,'""'011n+-v 1 s est i l'T"Ct~ 0f ti'"ie~ r cost then 
Another provicion entilte0 the appellant to one-half of anv fees that 
Westcor collected for connections to the water or sewer system. It is 
certainlv difficu1t to see whv the appellant should be able to share in 
savinqs which Westcor rrioht realize on the development costs unless it 
·.;as much more tho3n o3 rrere ce11 er of th.e 1 a""· 
'T'he contract also exoresslv authorized Bitner Comoany's Prin-
ciPal s to sel 1 as rranv lots as thev could in the sub0ivi sion. ('T'. 143' 
when the lots initiallv went up for sale, l•'estcor liste0 some of the 
lots with a real estate aoent and enoaoed in no other sellino activity 
'l'he appellant (or actuallv three of its principals) erecte<l a large 
billboard nn the propertv facinq the adiacent J-1~ FrPewav which adver 
tised lots for sale. ('T'. 14 4) During the next approximatel.v three 
months those individuals sold one-third of the lots in the entire 
subdivision. Por makinq those sales, Blaine B. Bitner and his brother, 
Willis Bitner, were personally Pain sales commissions exceeding 
s l 2 '0 () (). 
'T'he aPPellant further agreed with Westcor ". to siqn any 
ancl all documents necessarv for the completion of the pro1ect including 
c:ovenants, aoreements, appJ ication, etc." ILast page of Fxhibit 23). 
~either apoe11ant nor anv other defendant could remember exactlv when 
this portion of their aoreerrent was executed. However, it was cl earl v 
established that nine days after the Uniform Real Fstate Contract was 
-17-
Sianec1, appe1Jant, hy its oresic'ent, '1laif'<'> P. '1itf1P', cjq,-,p,'l j-1-;p 
Fscrow Pund Agreement (E'xh. ?4\ FilPr' •,vit'1 "urrrnit r0unh; tn oht-,•ir 
final aooroval of the .subr'livision plat. "'his ,oorPPrnent ir'Pnt;c;,,,.i "' 
appellant as "the corooration" whic'1 " ... has aarPeri tn unde>rt-ako 
certain and various imorovements in the c1evelooment of rea 1 ProPerti•c 
known as Parkridge Estates •.• ". Paragraph 1 of the F:scrow Fund 
Agreement states: "'l'he corporation agrees to complete, within a PPr1~,4 
of twenty-four months beginning from the rate of fina 1 approval 
of the official plat " the subdivision improvements. 
graph 2 states: 
Escrow. In guarantee of the timelv completion of 
said specified improvements, the corporation hereiri 
assigns and sets over to the county all its riq'1t, 
title anc1 interest in the Principal of that escrow 
account with Utah Security Mortgaoe ... in the 
amount of $7.84,400 ••• 
Para-
In January, 197Q, approximatelv two months after the Fscrow 
Fund Agreement was filec1 with Summit rounty, the appellant signe>d an~ 
recorded Protective Covenants for the subdivision development. 
bit 27P). 
'T'he appellant's presiaent testified that he signea these doc~ 
ments on behalf of the appellant because the county reouirer' them to oe 
executed by the record title owner of the land. However, no evic1enc 0 
was Presented which showed anv such requirement existed, even though 
county commissioner and the director of planning for Summit rountv 
testified as witnesses. 
'T'he Court also noted evicence of a 1oint venture in the ac"s 
of the parties after the subaivision lots were first ofFerec1 for sa 1•· 
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r-nr:-P C"'r-:i~l-("/"1 , thi::- r4(')1•0 1 0011~rt- '")rnr:p~-:i;lp'4 ,::i~cnr-rliro: tn thi=? ol_an Oevelooei~ 
' 1' t-hn 10fl0ll_:::irrt- Cl!l~ 01'"t'":l)irn;"]lril•j :'.jQflrrJFPrl \1v ~u:rimit r'()IJntv at. tlJ~ 
~x~Pot For snme mate~iAls that were 
caiC, f0r !>v ''7PStcor ("'. ?"7P\, a 1 1 cnnc;tructiO'l of tl-ie suhr1ivision 
improvements was PPrformPr1 hv a cnmoanv owner1 anr1 ooerated by the 
3ocellant's president, or bv otl-iers under contract with the accellant. 
Another significant point was the position taken by the apcel, 
lant in a comcanion case brouqht bv other 1ot owners in February, 1Q80 
'im Lvnn, et al. v. l•Jestcor, <>t al. rras"' '10. c;opc;). "'l-iat case in-
volverl alleaations of fraurl anrl misreoresentation against al1 the 
~efendants, for which damag"s were reauesterl toqether with a receiver-
ship to assure that the income From the lot curchases would be used fo. 
comcletina the suhriivisi0n imcrovements. The accellant herein as well 
as Westcor, Doualas Monson and Plaine P. qitner, were defendants In 
that act ion. From the outs<>t, ~ol-in navis r<>Presented a11 of those 
~efencants, iust as in the instant case prior to tbis apPeal. In 
testimonv durina the trial of the instant case, principals and repre-
sentatives of the aPPellant acknowledged that in~ all of the defen-
jants represented by Mr. Davis had consistently represented to the 
~curt that their resPective Positions in connection with the subdi-
1ision development were identical and all consented to the entrv of 
1rders which imposed on them ioint anrl several liabilitv for fi1inq 
1onrls and install inq the subdivisions improvements within specified 
leadl ines. The same witnesses further acknowledged that in neither the 
~case nor the instant case have either the appellant or anv of its 
irincipals or Westcor or anv of its crincipals filed anv cross-claims 
-JO-
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th A instant case the apoe1lant har1 nr>r ar ri'1V ti'Tl~ t-i<,,r th0 ,-,. -., 
;_ t w 2 s me r ~ J v a s e 1 l e r 0 F t ""'p 0 r 0 0 p r t \' ~ \,' p r "-: ~ r> I J 0"' t· 
involved the same unr1erlyino facts. 
"'aken as a whole thesP facts r1escr i he a 10i nt VAnturp r,., 
profit. '!'he appePant contributed its lano and Westcor was tn cont1 
bute financing for construction of the subdivision improvements. ,,,.," 
sales were conducted iointly and the resultino income was split. 
"'he appellant claims that under its aqreement with ooestcor 
had no risk of loss, which, as a matter of 'aw, Preverits a f 1 nr1ino -.• 
joint venture. 
the 1 aw. 
But that is not a true nescr i ot ion of the aore<:>rnent -. 
T,osses arf' not ment i onec'I at all in the aoreem1>nt w'i i ch i mo' ~c 
that the issue was simply never considereo. '!'he orincipais and ren••· 
sentatives of both the aPpellant anr1 Westcor did tf'stiFy that each 
expected the lots to sell fairly cruicklv for an anticipater total of 
about $1,000,000 ("'. 269) rwhich turned out to be a low hut Fairly 
accurate guess). Under that estimation, the lots could hav"' solrl Fr" 
twenty percent less and both the apoellant and westcor still wouln ~a1•• 
received S400,000 each as a ~0-~0 sPlit of the qross oroceeds. Assum-
ing then that Summit County's estimate of the expPnse for construct·-o 
the subdivision improvements of S/'8S,OOO was correct, an $80n,onn arJs1 
would still have netted Westcor a Profit of roughly s11s,non for 3 
minimal amount of work. '!'here would have he en a loss on 1 v if thp 
sixty-five lots sold for less than a total of sr;s~.ooo rS400,000 r 
appeDant and S:?85,000 for improvementsl or less than Sl 1,000 Per ' 
-?0-
0 ::" r ,-, ~ 1-- , , 'r 1 , , f '' r f- '., r> +- ,.,, , ~'1] r- 1 ~\.-, '1"',P•~, ; t-c r::.,:;c·; tn Un~Ar.Stan~ 
,:t- 1,.•r11l,< 1 nco 1"1'1Ql'""'p1; WCI::' rii=;ivAr C0'1-
=1.-l,;-,rf?r1 t--'J t-hp .=inor::. 1 lar.1-. 
=Pf't 0 ri ~+: tri;:i1 ti,at s11r:-f-, ci nns-:::.i~.i 1 ir',' 1:1:~:=; ronc:irlpreri 0r that the 
oarties saw anv other sian1ficrint risk of loss in connection with this 
~evelopment. "'hat is the most 1 JkPlv explanation of why the risk of 
loss is nowhere covered in the parties' aareement. 
Put even if thP ~ann,oon fiaura was ronstrued as orecludina 
t~e s~arina of lnss, thP aarPeme11~ ~t1 
·1 P n t u r e uncle r P a s s e t- t •; . P a ~ e r , c: 'Jr:'" a . 
satisfies the test for a ioinl 
"'here the rourt said that ioint 
vef1turers stooul d be obl iqater to share i" anv i osses " unless 
t~eri? is an a~reerner:t rn the contrarv .. 
It should a 1 so he noter t-hat- the contract could be read as 
0 ntitling aooel 1 ant to one-half of al' pav111ents from the sale of lots, 
w'11't'11'r or not the eventual total eYceeded or was less than $400,000. 
•dmittedlv, this rplates to an a111biquity in the contract, but one of 
the exhibits stating pavment terms does entitle the appellant to one-
1alf of all proceeds and Blaine Bitner testified he understood the 
3ppellant was entitled to one-half of all sales. If that is correct, 
then t'1ere could have been no losses unless the whoJe pro1ect sold for 
i es s t: ha n S ~ 7 O , o on 1 S 2 R ~ , On n ti mes 2 l . 
"''1e trial court couln a1~o have mane its findina of a ioint 
venture hv considering how well these same facts describe a simple sale 
0f t'1e orooertv. "'he apoellant oresumes that if some element normally 
found in a ioint venture aarPe~ent is missinq then a io1nt venture 
_; 1 -
sale of the propertv. "'hat is not true. 
not consistent with a simole sale of the 1 anr. 
"'he appellant claimed that it merelv sola the nrnpertv tn 
Westcor, but the type of sale it aescrihes is a conveyance of all the 
seller's rights and interests in the propertv exceot Perhaps for a 
standard securitv interest. However, a securitv interest is not what 
the appellant retained in this propertv. TnsteaCI, it rF>ta i nF>n subs tan 
tial and extensive interests in the nevelopment itself. Tt wou1r 
actuallv be morF> accurate to sav that the apoeJlant onlv soJr Mesrc0• 
share of the development. A sale of all intE'rests is a simole sale; 
sale of a part interest in a risk oevelooment is a ioint venture anrl r' 
definition cannot be otherwise. "'herefore, the trial court haCI no 
choice about categorizinq the appellant-Westcor aqreement as a ioint 
venture. 
POIN'T' II 
'l'HE APPELLAN'T' rs SEPARA"'ELY LIARLF AS A SOLF: ITF'N"'UPEP 
IN 'l'HE DEVELOPMEN'l' PROJEC'T'. 
In andition to the fincing of a ioint venture, the trial court 
concludec that the appellant became the sole venturer in the subdivi-
sion oevelopment beqlnning in the sorinq or earlv Summer of 1Q80. 
(C'onclusions of Law No. F, P. 787). "'he appellant's brief comoletelv 
overlooks this point even though it •enders the appellant inCiePF>ndent 1 
liable for the respondent's damages whether or not this rourt ~FFirmc 
the finding of a ioint venture with ~estcor. 
As early as March, 1~80, the aooellant representen to the 
-2?-
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·.'f:>ct-,~f'r i:- 1-!-,~ r11r~i· .. 1".:'i,-,r ,4p,,~-,lnnmr.>nt- -=i,...,,1 (.;0ul~ hr>rir:0f=0rth hp so]e1v 
"'he secon.r' 
IFxhibit 2RP). Under the terms of this Aqreement, Westcor assigned to 
John navis as trustee for the aooelJant all of its right, title ana 
interest in severa1 lot contracts anr'I anv funr'ls then on deposit with 
Ptab 8ecuritv Mortaaa<". Tn PXChana<" •or this assianment, the apoellan. 
anr' Westcor releaser'! Pach nther with fu11 satisfaction of all obl iqa-
tions unr'ler th<" ~ovPmber 1, ia~R ccntr~ct anr'I the aooel1ant agreer'! to 
holr'I Westcor anr'I Doualas ~. Monson " harmless of anv liabi1ity 
arisina out of th<" r'evPlooment of fthe subdivicionl " 'T'he clear 
ouroose of this aareement was to remove westcor from the proiect ano 
restore fu 1 l control to thP appel iant. 
~he appellant asserts this agreement can be aiven no signifi-
cance because it container'! a conr'lition subseaent which was not satis-
fied. ~his claim is r'lirectlv rebutted by the terms of the condition 
subsequent itself. Furthermore, both Rlaine B. Ritner and Douglas 
Monson testified at trial that the Trust Aareement was then in effect 
and haa alwavs been in effect since the r'late it was executed. 
~he condition subseauent is found in oaraaraph 6 of the Aqree-
ment ana reads in its entirety as follows: 
1'\itner and Westcor aaree to both use their best 
efforts in obtaining c 1 ear title and possession of 
the uniform Peal Pstat" rontracts on the aforemen-
tioned lots. If said contracts cannot be recovered 
hv ~ovember is, 1aeo, this Aareement sha11 become 
-23-
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Given thP Fr.rca01 '1ll t--Pc::t-- 1 ""',-,r·. • • 's har~ to undPrstAnr' how 
thP apoPllant roui,, in qoc··' f,:;d'~ •"Pf"SPnt to this rourt that it is 
not nnunrl by the 'T'ru8t- .f'i.rirPp:nnrt r-rr:.:i~Jc:-p nf the cc-'1,_,i t inn su~seauent. 
-;::;'1jrt"~Pr[l'f)f~ 
1 
1-hn r 0111] l r.~fl'Pilt°:'.'-
""st pfforts in obtaininq the 11steil contrActs ;ind it is 
11 his is comoletelv untrue. r·1Pstcor revnkerl ~ t:=: 0 ar1 i'=r assiannient of 
those contracts to Ronnpvi llc mhri tt anc executer' assiqnments on each 
contract to ~nhn Davis as mrustP" for aooPllant. ~ach of these assiq1 
11ents was culv recorr'ed anrl as "f the r'late of trial, "r. Davis was 
eithe• collecting or attemPtina t0 collect on each of those contracts. 
t~ i v e n t h e s e f a c t s i t i s h a r d t o s e e h 0 w "' e s t co r co u 1 d h a v e d o n e m o r e t o 
'IPliver title to the appellants. 
'T'he aopeJlant's sole anc "xc1,1sive control over the subcivi-
sion r'levelopment unrler the 'T'rust Aareement beginning in earlv }qgn is 
c r u c i a l 1 •; i moo r t an t . mhis aave tfie aooellant a Full annual construe-
tion season to out in the remainder of the suhrlivision improvements and 
o" i 1: '"""t the ~iovemher lORQ r'ear' 1 ine i.n the Escrow Fund Agreement. 
0 0th Plaine f'. Pitner anrl '1is son, RoaPr 'l'tner rwho was in c!"'arae of 
most Of this COnstr11ction work) tostifjo(' t-hi'lt n0thif'C nrP','0~J,,,o C''l"-
pleti.n<:? corstruction of the suh~ivi~ion -irnornvpfT'Prtc ei t-h0r ir 1 0·~ 
in 1<1RO. ("'. 141-1'12, 027\ Tt was mere1v a 'll'ltter 0f f"Ai<ino t!'P nP<'P'·-
sarv effort. If that effort hacl been marle, no clamaaes woulc" have haa-
sufferecl by the respondents and this lawsuit would not have heen fila• 
'T'he respondents sianed Farnest ~oney Aareements on each of 
their houses during the Summer and earlv Fall of 1°80. "'he onlv thinn 
necessarv to close those sales was completion of the subdivsion im-
provements. ~orec1osure proceedinqs were not intiaten aaai,.,st respor-
dents until December, 1980. 'T'hus, the resoonclents would not havP bpon 
iniured if the appellant had merelv done what it was able ann ohliaate' 
to do when it had sole control and resoonsibilitv over this proiect. 
Rut instead of any good faith effort bv the appel 1 ant to meet these 
obligations, the record shows that during the entire year of J 0 80 the 
only progress made on the subdivision improvements was comoletinq t~e 
excavation work (which had largelv been done the year before) and som• 
further work on the road bed. "'he water reservoir, pump house, and 
connecting Pipes remained to be done on the water system and the roarlo 
still needed to be graveled and caved. 'T'hese 1 atter items were fin-
ished in the Spring and Summer of 1081, respectively. Appellant's 
failure to complete these last items in 1980 left the respondents' 
houses without water and accesible only over dirt roads that were 
largely imoassihle except when they were dry. "'he reduced Price whic' 
the respondents had to sell these houses for was prompted solelv hv t'' 
buyers agreement to assume al 1 the risks concern i no comol et ion of t'''"· 
improvements. 
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'T'}-l'P rnnRrn ppnpi:;:or,v pnril\1n mµC' opc:p()~1r>'t"'f'l'T'C: 'Tlf) ~f:' rriUIPI) 
p1\P"'Y Rl"~1FFT('Tl\PTFC: l'Pnpp ~'lTF PS('pnr,1 PP~ln /'I'll' "'Pf!C:'T' 
Fff'J[) !\GPPH'l':'""'". 
'T'he trial court's rnnciu~ioris nf T,aw incluclen the following: 
(R. 786-787\ 
1. Under the escrow fund agreement aei ivered to 
Summit rourtv on or ahout November o, lq7q, to 
induce final approval of the subdivision olat for 
Parkringe "'states fthe appe1lantl was responsible 
for ohtaining the reauiren financina and completing 
the construction of the subcivision improvements on 
or before Novemher q' io8o. , 
4. Plaintiffs are thirn partv beneficiaries of the 
aforementioncl escrow Fund agreement. 
7. f"'he appellantl is separately liable for all 
liabilities of Westcor arising out of the Parkridge 
Fstates developments pursuant to hole harmless pro-
vision in the "'rust Agreement executed hv those 
parties on or about ,'lune ~O, 1Q80. 
8. f"'he responr'lentsl are each third Partv henPfi-
ciaries of the aforementionecl "'rust Agreement. 
'T'here was abundant evidence presented at trial to support the 
finding that the two contracts mentionec were executed at least in part 
for the benefit of purchasers of the lots in the subclivision. 'T'he 
aDPellant oresenten no evir'lence in support of any other interpretation 
of these contracts. AccordingJv, the trial court nicl not commit anv 
error in finding that the resPondents were thircl partv beneficiaries. 
It is a well establ ishee1 rule in Utah that in appropriate 
circumstances, Parties mav assert thircl partv rights ann benefits uncler 
a contract to which thev were not signatory anc for which they pain no 
consideration. r1_ark v. American Standarn, Inc., 583 P.2cl 618 (Ut. 
-27-
'llrust ~omoanv v. First c~curitv Corri0rati0n, 0 r1t. ?? J1c:., JLI1 n.?il 0 1 
tests cited bY Professor rorbin for determininq when a person aual ifi•, 
as a thirn party beneficiary to a contract: 
A third party who is not a oromisee and who 
gave no consideration has an enforceable riqht by 
reason of a contract made by two others (]) if he is 
a creditor of the oromisee or of some other oerson 
and the contract cal J s for a performanc" by the 
promiser in satisfaction of the obliaation; or (2\ 
if the oromised performance will he of Pecuniary 
benefit to him, and the contract is so expressed as 
to give the promiser reason to know that such bene-
fit- is contemplated by the promisee as one of the 
motlvatinq causes of his makinq the contract. A 
third parfv may be included within both of these 
!)revisions at once, but neerl not be. 
Ii..:_, at 46~ P.2d 415. 
~he cases have also held it essential that the original par-
ties to the contract intended to confer a benefit on the third partv iF 
he is to be a beneficiary. rlark v. Americ?n Standard, Inc., ~· 
If such intent is found, the lack of privity is no defense to an action 
on the contract hv the third partY. ~his was made very clear in 
Walker Bank ana ~rust rompany v. First Secur i tY corp., supra: 
It is often stated that Privitv of contract is a 
prereauisite to holding one 1 iable for breach of a 
duty thereunder. But it is also recoanized that 
there are duties to others than the immediate par-
ties, where from the nature of the contract, it is 
plainly evirlent to the Promiser that the contract is 
for the benefit of third persons, and that failure 
to discharge his duty woulrl adversely effect them. 
Id. at 341 P.2d 945, ~4F. 
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t-hnc-0 11 0rni:i. 'T1hr::. olairt-ift= 1..;a'"' r:1_i-=lrrl-i,~n !I~ T,itern for rni_nor r.bi.1r1reri 
~hPit mother~ 'T1hp mnt-ht?r, wl-rile sriP 'VAS a 1 ivP, maintainerl a ch~cki_na 
account with the 0Pfendant hank anr har mare arranaements to have the 
premiums for that insurance paid out of her account automatJcally each 
month. ~he defendant bank comp] ied with that arranqement for several 
months, then inadvertentlv neglected to make the payments, resulting in 
a termination of thP life insurance policv shortlv before the mother'' 
ilea th. Tn the resultina action aaainst the refendant bank this court 
held the children were third oarty beneficiaries of the bank's aaree-
ment with their mother to make the insurance payment. ~he rourt's 
opinion defined the relationshio hetween the bank and the children's 
mother as: 
... that of debtor-creditor to the extent of the 
customer's balance, anc1 it is the bank's duty to pay 
up to that amount to anyone on the depositor's order 
and in conformity with his direction . 
Under the circumstances here shown, it was evident 
to the bank that the monthly craft covere<'l the 
insurance premiums and that failure to pay them 
woulc'l result in lapse of the pol icy and loss of 
protection thereunder. µavina acceoted the respon-
sibility, the duty to fulfill it ran both to the 
fmotherl and to her beneficiaries for whom she main-
tai ne<'l the policy .•. Its failure to do so renders 
it liable to the beneficiaries who were harmed 
thereby despite lack of privitv between them. 
Td. at 341 P.2d 04~. 
~he escrow fund agreement in the instant case is very much 
like the checkinq account agreement in the Walker Bank case in that the 
appel J ant was obl j qa ted to have 2 specif i.c fund on nepos it i. n a par-
-29-
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preamble to the Aareement states: 
WHEPPAS, Westcor anrl Ritner arP rlPsirous nf pffpct-
ing compliance with the C"ourt nrr'ler of March<, iopn 
fin the ~ actionl anC! Preservinq the assets .. 
Damages were claimed by the p1aintiffs in the~ lawsui.t, anC! qive" 
that context, it wouln appear verv unlikely that the holCJ harmless wac 
not intended to cover liabilities to the lot Purchasers, Particularlv 
when the Agreement says "any Jiablities" arisina out of the suhr'livisinc, 
develoPment. 
Moreover, it would be fundamentally unfair anC! uniust to 
exclude the Jot ourchasers from the protection of the holn harmless 
agreement. ~he consideration which Westcor gave to the aooellant for 
the hold harmless was all of the assets which Westcor then hPld from 
the subdivision deveJooment. If these assets haC! not been conveyed t~ 
the appellant then they would have been available to J iauidate and 
apply against the respondent's iuC!gment against Westcor. Since the 
appellant received the assets, it seems on1y fair that it assume the 
related liabilities as well. 
~he appellant argues that the hold harmless shouln not be 
enforceable in any event because it violates oubl ic policy in allowina 
immunity in connection with the commission of fraud. ()f course, th~t 
is not how the hold harmless would work in the instant case. 
was rendered against the appellant and Westcor iointlY ann severallv 
and Westcor made no cross-claim aqainst the appellant for any sums it 
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mherefore, 
~~ 0 r c. i rr on r t a. n t 1 v , th P 
,--. ,~I l ,- .,.. .... , a ;i p n C' F ; 'l ;i ; n (l (\ f f- r r< 
c0nn~ction wit~ thP r 1 ai~~ of rpcnnn~~nt~ ~1;11 iam Dean an~ Patricia 
qoqers, and no oortion of the iuda~Pnt arantPd to these respondents was 
hased on a findinq of fraud. Fraud was found against westcor and 
Douglas ~onson in connection with transactions involving respondent 
Harold Bennett, but these transactions in no wav involved respondents 
Accordinaiv, the hold harmless would onlv provide immunization 
to W<0stcor aqa inst 1iahi 1 it i es For '-"eacb of contract. 
Finally, aope11ant asserts that the respondents can cla5m no 
benefit under the hold harmless clause because they are "incidental" 
beneficiaries. ~o suooort this c 1 aim, the apo<0Jlant auotes an illus-
tration from Corbin which acoe3rs in this rourt's ooinion in 
~ch':::'~!!!~~ ~· rorhi n's i 11 ustrat ion says where A 01-,es money tc, 
rand B promises to supply A with money to cay bis oebt to C, C cannot 
maintain a suit against Ron the promise. rlear 1 v, the instant situa-
tion is significantly different than that described in the illustra-
tion. Jn Corbin's example, B is not in any waY involved in the trans-
action between A and C' givina rise to the debt, so it would be improper 
to make B vulnerable to suit by r merely because of the completely 
secarate aareement between A and B. Jn the instant case, the appellant 
is no disinterested lender. ~he debt to the respondents is oirect]y 
tied in with the transaction between the apoellant and Westcor, and the 
acpel1ant is eitl:er a ioint v<0nturer in the oroiect out of which the 
debt arises, or assumed all of the assets and liabl15ties when taking 
-33-
r-rhis is rar=lica11v ~iffer~nt frolT' the ('nrhln ;i1ust:r-:i+-1"!'"1 lr.0 nrn·.>i~~r-. 
were third partv beneficiaries of this hold harm 10 ss aorPPmPnt. 
~his result is consistent with other casas which hav 0 con-
siaered a similar Fact situation. For example, in Mull ins v. Fvans, 
~·the plaintiff claimer liability against the refenclant basen on 3 
hold harmless clause in a contract between the defendant and a corpor 
atlon whose business had been purchaser hy the nefendant. The clain-
tiff's claim concernecl a clebt alleqecllv owed by the predecessor corpor-
ation. This rourt found the c 1 aintiff not entitlecl to a iudament 
against the defendant because it had no knowledqe of the plaintiff's 
claim when the hold harmless was entered into. The rourt went on tn 
say that such a claim could stand, however, if notice had been given, 
even though the claim itself was continqent in nature: 
If the purchaser knew of the continqent obligation 
of the rcompany purchasedl, there miaht be a basis 
for the claim against it by fthe plaintiff] on a 
theory of a third party beneficiary contract. 
However, in th is case there is no proof that ft he 
defendantl knew or had any reason to know that [the 
plaintiffl would claim a commission on machines 
which it would manufacture and sell. 
Id. at 1119. 
In the instant case, a great deal oF evinence was cresented 3' 
trial showing that the respondents had notifier the apcellant of thei' 
claims on several occasions prior to the signina of the Trust ~qree-
ment. 
In other cases involving the curchase of onqoinq businessas 
where the purchaser aivas a hoJcl harmless to these' 'e•, and the par-
-34-
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dPht which the rlpfendant cla\med harl bePn offset and discharoed. The 
plaintiff had previouslv Purchaserl another companv which owed the 
defendant monev, and the plaintiff had aoreed to hold the companv 
purchased harmless of all of its debts. Pelving on the hold harmless, 
the deFpndant deducted thP amount nwed to it bv the companv ourchased 
Fro'T' a seoarate amount thP defendant owed to the olaintiff and paid the 
djfferencP. 'T'he Idaho Supreme rourt ruled thP defendant was entitled 
to the setoff . 
. . Since the parties intended tfo?t fthe plain-
tiff] assume and oav the debts of the fpurchasedl 
business, including tfoe debt owed to fthe defendantl 
and since this arrangement was suooorted bv adeauate 
consideration and not rescinded, it is clear that 
the fdefendantl is a third Partv beneficiarv of that 
contract. As such, it is entitle<' to asser.t and 
havP iudgment in its favor bv way of setoff. 
Id. 564 P.2c 0 80. 
'T'he same result occurred in Kennedy v. Lvnch, ::13 P.2d J26J, 
8'i N.M. 470 (J073l. 'T'hp plaintiff there was a contractor who sued the 
defendants for failing to oav a debt for oround improvements work on a 
trailer park. One of tfoe defendants was the owner of the trailer park 
at the time the work was done anc1 the other npfennant was a subseauent 
ourchaser of the trai 1 er park who agrf'>ed to assume the debt owed to the 
plaintiff. 'T'he rourt stated the followino in affirming a iudgment for 
thf'> plaintiff against both defendants: 
" •· fo- .-
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pojnt in tirre. rrihose same rehts ?.rri PY'!")Pn.:::::ec wPrP lµ~,-:- ;:; 1 
the construction loans was mn•p than SR,nnn.nn. 
tion of lost profit at the time the eiHl ier contract,- 1-1PrP Prt: 0 rPi' 
would have procluced a fiqure in about the c;ame ranaP as t:hat C:? 1 r11-'arc~ 
for January, ios1. The offset to these increased exPenses was aoorn-
ciation in that real estate market. 
~he appellant next asserts that the respondents should have 
been awarded less in damages hecause they failed to mitioate those 
damages. mhis is Patently untrue. 
ably in holdinq out for as Jong as thev coulrl on the continuina hooe 
that the subdivision improvements would eventually be completed and t• 
houses could be sold for full value. Tf the respondents harl been ab 1 c 
to hold out lonq enough, there would have been no damages. mhe resoor 
clents sold before the subdivision improvements were comoleten only 
because they had no other option but to iet the houses to oo to fore-
closure and risk losing their credit rating and all of the out-of-
pocket expenses thev had incurred. Tn these circumstances, it is 
difficu1t to see how the respondents could have done anvthino more to 
mitigate their damages. 
The appellant also attacks the appraised va 1 ues as beina 
speculative. However, the aPPellant made no obiection to aooraiser'5 
credentials when he testified at trial. Nor did the apoellant offer 
any evidence to show that the va'ue of the houses in Januarv, 10R1, w?• 
less than the value set bv the aPPraiser. To contest trose va 1 ues nro'" 
as being somehow unacceptablv speculative is a poor ancl imorooer suh· 
~I],.- ; r.fl I-~ f~ t- ( i i l 
0 
f:' i !'""'.a 1 1 './ , t- \.-.. 0 · "°! r 'r· 0 l 1 ?! '1 t ; r !' '' r r- ~ C' t 1 V ,4 r o tJ e::::: t-}; at +: ~ e re S PO n -
that i_ s 1·1 i, en the r ~soon 11 en t ~ ' c 1 Q i rr';:: 0 rose. mhp respondents cou1d 
araue that their claims first arose on ~10vember 1, i970, which is the 
date for comoletjon stated to thelT' hv the real estate agent who sold 
them the lots anc1 the ClearJ1ine speciFjed in the initial contract be-
tween the apoellant and ~Pstcor. Aoart frorr that, the resoondents' 
clajlT' wou 1 d arisp onlv when a force" sale at discount occurrea after 
"ovelT'her l, 1080, which is '=',e ~p,o;r11 ne st2tea in the Fscrow Fund 
Aareement with SumlT'it rountv. The respondents' claim arose when they 
lost orofjts due tn the aopPllant's hreach, and that event did not 
occur until January, 1981. The resoondents were not c1amaged hv loss c 
profit in Julv or September, 1°RO, since at that time thev hac1 no 
agreement with anvone to sell these properties at a c1iscount. 
mhe foreaoina consiClerations constitute suhstantia1 suooort 
for the trial court's calculation of damaaes, and for that reason the 
amount awarder to the resoondents should be affirmed in all respects. 
P0Jlll'!' V 
THE mRIAL rQURT ~AS rQRPErm mn DENY m~E APPELLANT'S 
MOTIONS pnp MISTPJAL. 
The aopellant arques in Point TTI of its brief that the rourt 
errerl in denvina "repeated" motions for a mistrial or for a new trial 
Puroortedlv because of a conflict of interest which became apparent 
rlurjnq trial. The clescriotjon of those motions js completely false. 
What the record shows is that two motions for mistrial were made but 
nei t~er was hnser on a cnnfl; ct- of i nt~rP~t ~r:::it\~1~;::.r. 10h:i n,~'' 1 -· '.:j;i,-1 'n: 
anv of his c' ients. l'n tlie cnnt-rar·J, t-'1e>•; 
appeJ'ant's all!"oation that t-h" "UQae>stion nf a cnnf' ;ct '-"2" ''"ina 
to Preiudic0 the rourt anc' impair 'Ir. Davis' ci'>ilitv to cio I-ii• i0h. 
"'he first motion was mac~e on Decern'"'er o, thP secon" nay c>f 
trial. "'he motion was brought unr1er Pule 1'3 of the ntah Ru 1 es of ri•Ji' 
Procedure which reads in pertinent part: 
(bl DISOUALIFICA'T'ION. Whenever a party to anv 
act ion or oroceec1 i no •. or his at tornev slia 1 J 
make ana flle an affir1avit that the iuc'qe before 
whom such action or Proceec1 i no is to be tr i ec' or 
heard has a bias or preiun1ci", either aoainst such 
party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite 
partv to the suit, such iurlge shall proceec1 no 
further therein, except to call in another iurlge to 
hear and r1etermine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the 
reasons for the belief that such hias or Preiuc'ice 
exists, and shall be filec' as soon as oracticable 
after the case has been assigned or such bias or 
preiudice is known. fPmphasi s <:uoo' i0rll 
Tn this instance, the judge was alleged to he Pr0iudiced 
against the appellant's trial counsel because of statements the iuc1ae 
had heard the Preceding evening concerning John Davis' standinq with 
the Bar. At the time Mr. Davis was the subiect of oroceec'inas brouqht-
by the State Bar before this rourt to suspend his 1 icense as an attor-
ney. Respondents first became concerned about the situation durina thp 
month prior to trial because suspension of Mr. Davis would would almost 
certainly have caused another delav of the trial. ~his concern was 
initially alleviated when respondents learned a couple of weeks befor• 
the trial that the suspension had not gone into effect and Mr. navi• 
would be able to represent current clients for another thirtv davs 
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'TihA ('c;i_irt ).-,~,1 cpj- ,.:ic-i~p l-1.;n r1rJ'/S ~nr 1-~o t..-ial 0f this Case. 
1n t-J..-:-,1- t\"0 r1a,vs ""'nl11;i nnt sufFice anil the 
rnL1rt srhPrJulprl a t-~ir(:] Ila\'. •1- thP Prr1 0f the seconr1 ~av, which was 
'>eceTT'ber 8, 1 08/, it becaTT'e clear tl-ia1- another one or two clays wou1r1 be 
needed beyond the third. At I-he encl of trial on the second day, when 
no one else was oresent hut the 2ttornevs ancl the Court, some discus-
sions were held as to when the ar1r1itional two r1ays could be scheduler1, 
One possibil itv cliscusser1 was movino the trial to Salt Lake rountv 
after the first o• the vear when ~ur1oe Wilkinson was reolacer1 in Summit 
rountv hy another ~hirr1 "istrict 1ucloe. TT'he orospect of this much 
delay aqain raised the responclents' concerns about Mr. Davis's possibl 
suspension. For that reason Mr. Davis was asker1 bv another attornev 
his situtation with the Bar would cause any prob 1 em about continuing 
the trial to .January. At that Point, Mr. navis merely respondecl that 
settinq the aclclitional davs in Januarv would not Pose a problem. 
TT'he next dav Mr. Davis asked for a conference with the Court 
in chambers where he macle his motion assertino that the Court was prei-
udiced against him after hearinq that he had problems with the Bar. After 
hearinq everyone's statements about this incident, the Court advised Mr. 
navis that it '1acl no idea what the nature his problems with the Bar 
were ancl di.r1 not care, because in no event would any such information 
effect the Court's r1ecision on the merits of the case. f'T'. dQ6-502) 
A potential conflict was mentioned during aroument on the 
motion, but not as a basis for the motion. Tnstead, the mention of a 
possible conflict bv other counsel was merely cited bv Mr. navis as 
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another instance wr.ich •t10u 1 ~ cause t-11e tri2 1 court 1:0 bp or"'-i ;,~,1~"( 1 
against bi~. ~he transcri~t of the motion c0nFir~~ thi~: 
MP. ~A'"7TS: T v1nu 1 n ma L<e :::- met; or 1Jrr1"? r Pu 1 '? ;:, 1 ri~ 
the fltah Pules of rivil Pr\lrP~LJrP. rnt•is inPrirrn~t-inr 
m a r e i n +: h e or e s e r c P a n c1 h e ;; r i n a n f t h P 1 u rl a " . 
constitutes malice and oreiuc1ice to~arrs me, as 
counsel, arr as a oartv, particu'arlv bec;;usP 0 f tha 
a11egations that have heen made against me oerson-
allv in this case, as well as the potRntial conflict 
of interest situation that miaht be inferred from mv 
reoresentjno oarties in this action that mav have 
adverse interest against each other. And on that 
basis, I believe that the two in connection with 
each other would constitute a bias and preiudicf' 
against me both as a party and as a counsel which 
would then reflect on mv client's i_n this case. 
'l'he truth about this motion then is that it was not hrought 
because of a conflict of interest but because the mere suggestion of 
conflict had supposedly biased the iudae. Furthermore, no affidavit 
was filer as Rule 63 requires. 'T'his in itself made the Court's renial 
of the motion proper. 
Basically the same reasons were cited in connection with the 
second motion, which was made at the close of plaintiff's case rm. gqc 
897). 'l'he exact nature of this motion is hard to describe, as can ~P 
seen from the motion itself: 
!'IF. DAVIS: . I would renew, or maybe it is not 
a renewal, but I would make again a motion for 
mistrial in this case at this time, anc1 T feel that 
this is the appropriate time to do. '!'hat based upon 
what has gone on thus far as an attornev I have bePn 
approached bv other counsel outsic1e of the court, as 
well as parties, I have been intimic1ated, I have 
been accusec1 of various unethical practices and r 
have been caller derogatory names, which I as an 
attorney am notable to respond because it is 
directlv to a client. 
Based on those feelinas, as wel 1 as T feel tbat we 
have gone on now for three anc1 a half davs nutting 
on the Plaintiff's case and I have been continuouslv 
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TT''3r'l 11,'~ t-r0cc0r T \.- 'Cj\!P. rri.~r"P i;::: -:ir3('1 tjt-pl '/ l""I() way 
t 1'1 ~ t- T r 0 f1 r r, 'T' r. 1 e I- r 'll ,-.. ~ <-:: p r. 1,' \-hf? I? ri ,-J () f t ('ii! r'.:1 V a"!"" r:l 
r F~pl t-h.,:::i~ f'hprr-c 'T''rJh:f-_ h,p c0rn!'.? rrr::.t:=ir~f? Fee1inas 
()[ PrPiurli~"=' r~r t-h.p 0al'."t- r,+: thp f'ourt t~at Tam i_n 
s0rne wcv ::=1-?1 11 ir.a 0r r~r:;;lpv1na, ;::ini! T fppl that 
poss i hl v t:hat rr iaht lPOParr< i ze rry ot'1er clients to 
the extent t:hat t:'1""' 011or t t:0 he given an opportun-
itv to obtain other counsel in this case, if thev so 
aesire, so that thev feel that they can be properly 
representea. 
I feel that baserl on a·1 ·1 of the circumstances that 
my other clients are not possiblv being adequatelv 
repres<:ntec' in this case, ann t woul.n move for 
mistrial nn that rasis. 
('T'. goc;, ROF). rrhe Court rleniec' the ~ot1nn, statina it did not know 
what Mr. navis was talking about ~ith respect to being callen names or 
beina intirnir1ated. 'T'he rourt notec' that it was Pressuring all the 
counsel in the case to Prnceen as <VPl] as Mr. navis ana then reiterate( 
that it die" .. not have anv anirno~itv or fee 1 ina either wav 
against any attornev or any Party." No other reason for 
denyinq the motion was given anc' Mr. Davis said nothina to incicate 
that the rourt had misunderstood his motion. Like the first, this doe 
not constitute a motion for mistrial on the ground that a conflict had 
developen between his clients which Prevented him from continuing to 
represent anv of them. 
rrhe appellant's statement that the purported conflict became 
clear "in the course of trial ... " rl'<poellant's Brief, p. 40) is also 
misleading and untrue. If there was anv conflict here it was well 
known to al 1 the parties frorn the outset. For example, Mr. Davis first 
appeared in this action on ~eptember R, ias1, at a hearinq on plain-
tiff's motion to enter default "udgrnent aoainst the appellant, Blaine 
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Bjtner, V7estcor, Douglas Monson ~n(l Mr. nauis nPr'.=11rcl 1 '.'. ~~r n.J•:;,. 
appeare~ at th2t time repr~~P0tirio on 1 v hirrsel f, fhn aoo>=> 11 1'1+- ~nr• 
B 1 a j n e R. P i t n e r . nu r i n a a r q urn P ri t \1 r . n av i c "Tl rl r~ i? t h P F n 1 1 1' 1_, · ; n . 1 - 1- ::i t : 
ment to the ~ourt: 
Tn that other action rreferrina to the Lvnn easel T 
represented both Westcor and rthe appellant! hecause 
in that position, there was no con fl ;ct of interest. 
I have been strugglina with the fact as to the 
conflict in this position, so Tam not representinq 
Westcor today. 
(Transcript of Plaintiffs' Moti_on for Rntry of Default :Judgment, p. 4 
Later in that same hearing, Mr. navis stated: 
'!'here was some confusion on resolvinq the 
claims between Westcor and fthe apoellant1 and mv 
own personal position as to whether T shoul~ reore-
sent both or the one. Whether or not fthe apPel-
1 antl should be claiming aoaint l•'estcor. 
('T'ranscript of Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default ,Tudgment, p. 71 
It is interesting to note that this l_ast statement was part oF 
Mr. Davis' excuse for fai1ino to file an answer on behalf of the 
appellant and four other defendants in the case for Five months after 
thev were originally served. When the ~curt subseouently set aside t' 
default certificates and allowed these defendants to file answers, ~r 
Davis filed answers on behalf of the apoellant and Westcor so it was 
reasonable to assume that whatever conflict was involved between them 
had been resolved. It is also interesting to note that Mr. Davis also 
represented these same clients in the Lynn case. 'T'hese lawsuits hav~ 
been going on for more than four years now, which is rather remarkab' 0 
if such a glaring conflict is present. '!'here is no indicatinn that l 0 V 
of his clients saw any conflict or had anv problem with him repres 0 n• 
ing them at any time prior to this apoea1. 
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n 0 t- ~ i !'i q 2 n ~ m () s t l i k e 1 '.' w t) •J l rl n n t h a . 7 p rl n n e -3 n v t ri ; n a ~ f t h e p 0 j n t h a a 
heen pressec' because .Tohn nav is i ~ a memt-·Pr oF the R i tner fam i J y. 'f'he 
appellant's present counsel was retained only after the suspension 
aoainst Mr. Davis mentioned creviously finally went into effect. ne-
scite all of this, the aocellant now savs that to serve ;ustice this 
Court shouL'l inval i ,,ate more >-han. Four vears of extensive Ji ti gation 'n 
two rna;or lawsuits because it made a had choice of counsel. 
Prom th<> co int of view of the r"2Pondents, it is no exaaaerci-
tion to say that this tvce of arqument is an insult to the concept of 
justice and eauitv. Tt would allrw the aocellant's own acts to denv 
th<> respondents the remedies to which thev have oroven themselves 
entitled after a areat deal of unreirnhursed expense. A retrial of thi 
case could cost another several vears of litiqation and thousands of 
dollars in adc'itional expenses. At the same time jt is completely 
unneccessarv because the appellant has another obvious remedy in a 
malpractice claim aaainst Mr. Davis. Pursuing that remedv would have 
no adverse effect on the respondents whatsoever. 'f'he fact this option 
is ignored says a areat deal about the appellant's real purpose for 
claiming a confl jct now for the first ti.me. 
Tt should also be noted that the presence of a conflict is 
itself arquable. 'f'here is no conflict if the appellant was a ioint 
venturer or if the 'f'rust Aareement is val id. 'f'he 'f'rust Agreement 
-4 c;_ 
which arose out of th~ suh0ivision r4pvP 1 0nrnC-1rt-. Dr01,rirl;nc: r'!' 1Jr<::'_r' 
TA7 es t c () r i n each Cl f t be 1 ah' s u i t s ~·I \.-i .; c ~ r p 1 a +-: ~ t (l t: h ~ ~ 'J r ri ; I, i r i ! ..... , n 
development is Jn accordance with that ohl iaation. 
FinalJv, the purportPc1 conFljct is rea1 1v much '110r" sianifi-
cant as evidence of the validity of the 'T'rust Aqreement rather than 
evidence of error. "'he appellant simply ~ouia not Provide counsel to 
Westcor unless it felt that it was obliaated to do so. 
POTN"' VI 
AN'I' FRROR 'T'HE C'OTJR"' MAY HA'TF' r'OM"1J"''T'F.f"\ I\"' "'PTAf, JS 
HJl.RML'!'SC: R>':r'Ar_TC:F "'PF' JIPPF'LLAN"' SP0!1Lf"\ T-TAVF f-11\D f'Ff'l\llI.'T' 
JUDGMBN"' FNTFRED AGAI~C:"' T"' PRJOP mn "'RJl\L. 
"'he appellant was served with the respondents summons and 
romplaint on April 11, 1981. service was made PersonaJlv upon thP 
appellant's registerec1 Process agent and Presirent, Rlaine B. Bitner. 
(R. 31-33). Mr. Ritner was also oersonallv server as a defenrant at 
the same time. ro. ::> 0 -30). '!'he appellant rid not answer the romPJainr 
within the required twenty days and a default certificate was filed and 
entered bv the Summit C'ountv rle~k on May 7, 1981. 
matelv four months after the default certicates were entered, the 
respondents mover the Court to enter default iudgment. Hearina on the 
respondents' motion was held before the Honorable Brvant rroft on 
September 8, 1°81. Notice of this hearina was given to the aprelJant 
and John Davis apoeared on its behalf to resist the motion. In his 
argument, Mr. navis admittec1 that failure to file an answer" •··~ 0 
reallv a matter of inadvertence and neglect. J think, excusahle, h•i' 
anyway it was an oversiaht." ('T'ranscript of Default <1earina, o. 41. 
• r,ir::Jt ;? '/0 1 Jr' ()0~jt-;on fer n0t 
~P f)flPTC::: ,1 11st 1 fi.::1ri 1 1~y tt?>rir:~ anri neai ect, Your 
~0J;()r. 
("'ranscriot nf f"'l'>fault f-lparina, r). ~l. 
'!'PF C'OTJR'T': W10l l, the rhino that troubles me, vou 
are aoparent 1 v tak i na a oos it ion "we rlon't care what 
the Rule savs about a defauit," vou see. 
MR. DAVIS: "'hat is not the case. 
'T'HE l'nTlR'T': "Disregard al 1 of tf-,ose rules of Proce-
dure, ~urlae, anrl lPt us Fi 1 e our answer because we 
are finallv qetrina arounrl tn it" which doesn't 
auite set rioht with 'T'P. 
1-'R. DAVIS: 'T'hat is not the intent to he flaarant to 
the Court. We arlmit there was an inadvertence and 
oversight on that Part. "'here was some confusion on 
resolvina the claims between Westcor and ~itner and 
my own Personal cosition as to whether T should 
represent both or the one. ~hether or not Pitner 
shoulrl be claimed aaainst ~estcor and with that, 
because all of these other issues are Presently 
involverl in gettino those imorovements in, and my 
client havina been involved in that, all for the 
benefit of the plaintiffs who have the on1v two 
homes in that subdivision right now, that it became 
an oversight. We are not trving to be flagrant. We 
are claiming that now that since we have received 
notice, iust a few davs aao, then, of course, it 
again brought it to our attention. "'here was no 
intent to abuse the rules or make a mockery of the 
rourt in anv wav. 
('T'ranscr i pt of Defau1 t Bearing, p. 7). 
'T'he foregoina constitutes the entire explanation which the 
appellant gave to the l'ourt for its failure to file an answer, which is 
to sav it offered no excuse at all. ~evertheless, the rourt set aside 
the default certificates and allowed the appellant to file an answer. 
Respondents respectfullv submit that the rourt's decision to relieve 
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Clecision. (?. 3 1 6) • 
"'he rule at issue here i 2 ~~ rc) o" the nt-ah Pul "'" rf ,~"iii 
~rocedure which reads: 
SE"'"'ING ASIDE DEFAULT. For cause aood shown the 
Court may set aside an entrv of default .. 
To accept the explanation offered hv Mr. Davis as good cause 
shown renders those terms meaningless. Under this standard, a party 
need only appear before the Court 2t sofl1e Point in order to he re' ievc 
from an obligation to comply with the rules, which nominally revokes 
the requirement that an answer be filed within twenty davs after ser-
vice of a Summons set forth in Rule 12. 
This was an intentional violation; the aPPellant did not ~ust 
overlook the matter. Respondents' counsel explained to the rourt that 
there had been some discussions between him and Mr. Davis ahout filinn 
an answer a short time after the default certificates were filed. 
Respondents at that time agreed to sign a stipulation which would set 
aside the default certificate if the apoel1ant would file its answer 
without further delav. Mr. Davis promised to do so. (Record of ne-
fault Hearing, p. 1) Despite that agreement no answer was forthcomino 
and a few weeks later the respondents' counsel sent a letter to Mr. 
Davis revoking the offer to stipulate. !Transcript of nefault Pearino 
p. 1) Mr. Davis did not disoute the occurrence or content of those 
discussions during his argument to the Court. "'he aopellant simolv 
refused to file an answer unti1 the rourt threatened it with default 
1udgment and then the the Court allowed the aooe1lant to fi1e its 
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lnci_.:r:>r C::l_,hl~<:f- t-n nn rJPr,:;il +=_'! wh3tc:np\7~r. 
'n\.-,~ (P.~C()f"\ rJi 1r0,.... ~' 1 t-1--p ("'r11rt- F~.r jt-c 0pcisi0n to Sl?t:" asjde 
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ticp where the case woul(l oroceer1 aaA1nst othPr r1Pfpnoants who hac 
filer' answerc and aqainst tlo,o aooel'Jnt rioon CPrtain cro<0s-c12ims which 
have been filed bv other defenr1ants who could not claim default. Fow-
ever, it is hard to see how revoking the rules of procedure serves the 
ends of iustice; in this instance it amounts to a reward for wrongful 
heh av i or. Furthe•mo!e, a ciqnificant decree of confusion or difficult· 
in oroceedinq with the apoel1ant ctanoina in default as to the respon 
dents was not very 1 ikelv. l"rp •Psoondents ohtainec c1efault iuClament 
against othPr defendants (Lon Banger and f1tah Security Mortgage) who 
participated in the trial in defense of various cross-claims with no 
undue confusion or difficultv whatsoever. ~hev simplv were not allow~. 
to gPt into anv subiects which r'ealt exc 1 usive1v with respondents' 
claims. ~he aoPellant woulr' have been in the same Position. Further 
more, the trial might have proceener' more smoothly with the dispute 
between the respondents ann appellant removed. 
While this rourt has stated in many cases that reasonable 
doubts should he resolved in favor of setting aside defaults Pitts v. 
Pine Meadow Ranch, 58Q P.2r1 767, 7/:8 mt. 1°781, some point must be 
defined where defaults will be sustained. ~his case is clearly one 
where the aooellant shoulc'I net have been excused fo!' failing to file an 
answer for nearlv five months because no excuse was ever made, and the 
concerns described by the rou!'t were too insignificant to warrant such 
tolerance of this contemotuous attitude towarn the Rules of Procedure. 
P."s such, +:hi.s ruli!la was ,::in af"-·11sP r..f the t-ri.::il ,.,, 1 1rr'- ,--1 ;.~,......r-,, 
s i n c e t}; e ca s e sh nu 1 r1 h 2 v P ri ~ 1.1 e r an r-i p t- n t- r- i 3 1 -:i: r · · 0 r ,.... 0 ,- ,_ .~"ff' ,n ; 1- 1- (-
A~TY PRROR ,1'I.LPr,P[\ PY 'T'l-1P A DDPT,f,A~'"' 1•7A. C: l-IA D"f, pc:c: PP!'/\ I'S F' 
'!'HF APPPLLA~'"' C:<-!()fJLD l-IAUF opp>.7 P()r_1 ~1n LTART,P "'() "'<-IP 
RESPONDENTS FOR NPGLTGEN'l' MISPEPRPSF'N"'A"'T()N. 
The respondents claimed the appellant was liable for damage~ 
resulting from its negligent misrepresentations concerning the exist-
ence of the escrow r'lepos it and the dates on which i nsta 1 1 at ion of the 
subdivision imorovements would he comoleted. The trial court mane nn 
finding concerning negligent misreoresentation hut it r'lir'I refuse •o 
hold defendant Blaine B. Bitner personally liable anr'I he is the oartv 
who made most of the misrepresentations. Resoondents respectfullv 
submit that it was error not to find liabilitv against the aooellant 
for negliaent misreoresentation. Reversina this error would render 
harmless anv other error this rourt might finr'I with resoect to the 
trial court's findings concerning the breach of contract claims. 
The elements of negligent misreoresentation were recentlv 
reiterated by this rourt in Christenson v. Commonwealth Land "'it'e 
Insurance ro., 666 P.2d 302 (Utah 19831 ci.tina :rar<'line v. Brunswick 
CO.££~_, JS TJtah 2a 378, ~81, 423 P.2d i:;c;o, 1'67 l]o1'7) as follows: 
Where (Jl one having a Pecuniarv interest in a 
transaction, 121 is in a suoerior oosition to 
know material facts, anrl 131 carelesslv or nea-
ligentlv makes a false representation concernina 
them, (4) expecting the other oartv to relv and 
act thereon, anc (51 the other Partv reasonah1 v 
does so and 161 suffers loss in that transction, 
the reoresentor can be held responsible if the 
other elements of fraud are also present. 
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.,n4_7111 rJt'1 r.rl. in71 1 • 
~s thP rlpfirition cuoaasts, a casual statement or 
gratuitous arlvicp From a ~•ranaer to a transaction 
cannot he the orounrls for naal ioent misrepresenta-
tion. The recioient of such information could not 
reasonahly rely on it because he could hardly expect 
the reprpsentor to exercise prunence and care in 
makinq •he statement that would warrant reliance. 
Tf, however, 
the information is qiven in the caoacitv of one 
in the husiness of supolying such information, 
that ,:are anrl diliaence srould he exerr.isen 
which is comoatihle with the particular business 
or profession invoiverl. ~hose who neal with such 
oersons rlo so hecause of the advantaaes which they 
expect to derive from this special competence. 
The law, therefore, mav well prerlicate -on such a 
relationship, the rlutv cf care to insure the 
accuracv and val iriity of the information. 
F. Harper & !". ,1ames, .§.':!~· ""7.Fi at S4f; 
[footnotes omi ttec'l. 
The evirlence in the instant case concerning negligent misreP-
resentation begins with the Pscrow Pund Agreement. As has been men-
tioned previously, the only oartv named or who signed that agreement a_ 
a developer was the appellant. The agreement stated that $284,400 had 
heen deoosited into an account assiqnea to Summit rountv to guarantee 
the timely completion of the subdivision improvements but in fact no 
funas or account Pxisted when the agrePment was siqnerl or afterwarrls. 
The agreement was aiven to Summit rountv as a condition for granting 
final approval for the suhnivision plat and accepted by the County as 
satisfaction of its requirement that Financina for uncomoleted improve-
ments be oroven before lots can be sold. ~he misrePresentation con-
cernina the funns and account was the Proximate cause of the respon-
-S l -
Cl en ts' CamaOi::?S because, 11 ~ut: f"rr" j +::, 1 nt-~ !, •. ...._,,, ,-i ""°'.'..., .... ~ ":, 
for sale without ac1eo,1atP fin2ncinn. 
of the 1ot owners, tl-iP ri=:socr:Cerits' c 1 ai'TI ~s r:r;t .~ic::c·J::i,;<=;i:-~ -:;.c-
Jack of orivitv with the apoe 11 ant. 
that lack of privity is not fatal to a neq1 iaent 'l'isr<>Dr"'s<>ntat;r'n 
claim, Dugan v. Jones, supra. 
This leaves the question of whether the rep~esentation was 
negligent. Substantial evidence to make such a findino was orov•aea "J 
the appellant's president, ~la•ne Eitn<>r. 
the appellant nor anyone associated with it knew anvthina ahout ~.,~·c~• 
or its principals before or after sianing the ~ovember 1 , ]Q78 aar<'>P-
ment. ("'. 13Cl-13Q) "'he reason the apoe1Jant c1jd not ~nnw anvth•ra w2c 
because it never mace anv effort to get any information. T• 1!1ac'P rio 
cre<'lit checks ("'. 134) and rlid not request financia 1 statem.,nts rm. 
132) or resumes from anv of ~estcor's orincipa1s. "'he appe1 1 ant did 
not even bother to ask how Westcor was goina to raise the fun"s tn oa' 
for the subdivision improvements. !"'. 1 3". 1 39) Tf even a minima' 
investigation had been made, the fraud being peroetratec1 by r'estcor 
would have become immediate 1 v aopa rent. I"'. 1 3 g). 
A simple credit check would have revealed that Westcnr c1id nnt 
even exist when the November J aareement was sianec1 or fnr a 'Pw mon•"c 
after that. It would have also revealec1 that Douglas Monson hac' a h'" 
credit history and Richard Johns, the other or•nciPa' officer of 
Westcor, was unemP1oyed. Financial statements wou1d have revea'erl t•a• 
neither r,restcor nor any of its princioal~ '1ac' anv sianificant 3ssP•s ,r 
-52-
:::-2""".c1r.c •_,.;,-:J~....:: ..... a.,:c 
• wi~hout at least 
so:rie ar-1--:;t,0:2 1 1 :e:'~;':3':.~'J"' .. h's test·monv both 'n aecosition ana 
.:. ~ 3::'.J ~ C:'.' 3araer, ·,.1ho were aJ so 
2~7\, then he 1 ater 
=-s" '.:'u• he cou'r not locatEO· 
it. Ee 
("" 
lcosO" i '::>]vi ora ~ ar"' Jnsecured oPr sora 1 1 oar For S284 ,d(1(1 from a 1 ender 
l'n 'ts face, tre oosstbilitv of such 
a 1 o a n a r r a n a e rr e !'. t ·..; a s ~ '? r:i o ': ::: i: '.' ~ a ·. t h e 1 e r.t s t . 
Blaine Pitner a"'~·tte"' ~rcwina that raisina 528~,000 was 
!'!'. 
~he acce' 1 ant h~~ 3150 "ecnt•atea with other parties about ioin-
1 nq ;r t'.;e ri:?velnorne!'.t:", hut !rl "TIOS: nf these insta!'"'CeS t~e neSJOtiations 
failed because the other oar•:ec rou 1 "' not raise the ~evelocment costs 
wit~nut oie~a~!'""'a the .. , .. 10 ':0 ':ne 1 -3r'~ as securitv, wriich the appe 1 ]__ant 
founr. Jriacceot:i~'t=>, I"" j 0 I\ 
In the enrl ~vPn PlriinP R!tnr::>r a(:irnirtr::>~ ti.-.rit i r hp~, i !'T'0rn 1 
checke0 on Westcor's anfl Doua 1 as l\~0nson 1 c \'rr.>rli +- ,"Jt t- 11 0 ,,,,1-,-,_-.t- rf"'<=>n "' 
aareement 1.o.10ulr1 have heen sjcn~(1 ::irr1 thic 1,,,·hc,1r:c. ".:'.i+-· 1 ~1-;",..., ,,.,..... 1 1 _, 
had occurred. No reasonahle anr' prur'ent PPrson wnu 1 r' ha~° F~, le~ •n 
at least that before l'>ntering into an aarpPment •,1it1-> co '"''ch ?t- -ta~o, 
particularlv in view of the lack of anv iustification For reoosinq sur• 
blind trust in these virtual stranaers. 
If the foregoing facts do not estabJ ish the appellant's neal i 
gence the Court still should have granted iudqment for neqJ iaent mis-
representation because the responr'ents claimPr' the riaht t-o have the 
burden shifted to the apoellant to orove it was not n°a 1 iaent- u'lr'Pr +-"' 
doctrine of res ipsa 1oauitur. 'T'o invoke this r1octrinp tre resoonr"Pnt' 
needed to prove three thinas: fll the misreoresentation was of a kin<' 
which, in the ordinarv course oF events, woulr' not hav<" haopener' har< 
due care been observed; (2) the respondents har' nothinq to r'o with 
making the misrepresentation; anr' fl) the cause of the misreorP8Pnta-
tion was something under the control or manaqement of thP aooe 1 lant, r• 
for which i.t was responsible. Lund v. Mountain F'uel <;uoolv ro., 15 Pt. 
2d 10, 386 P.?d 408 (1963\, Wightman v. l'-'ountain Fu,,1 c;uoolv ro., " r1 t 
2d 373, 302 P.2d 471 (1956). 
Without restating the facts, it is clear that the responr1ent'' 
claim met the foregoing tests. StatPments that funds and accounts 
exist are not usually false unless a great r1eal of carelessness is 
involved, the respondents had nothing to do with the makino the false 
representation, and the causl'> of the misrepresentation was somethino 
under the contol of the appellant and for which it was resoonsiblP tv 
the terms of the contract itself. 
-5d-
;-.' l ·- n, 
r-r·: 1-; r""ln·.' r-hat at t-hl? ti rne h 
r,( it~ nrinc1-;'J.=J 1 ,... '"=Jc- 11 • c. o;,ir' t:hev h3r ~2R4,000." l'f. 
Consirerina all nf tf-ie ""irlence presenterl at trial and viewi. 
it in a 1 i aht most- favorar,1 e tn th" respnnc'ents reveals more than sub 
~t-antial suPonrt- Fnr "~ch nf •~" •'rnircs mare bv the trial court whlc 
"""~ ; " cuhstant i al evi dl"nce liar not he< 
its unexplained failure to file an answer for over five months after ,: 
was servec1. 
neal igent misrepresentation. ~1nce the Court committed no error, or 
its errors wer" ha•m 1 ess, nr the errors it comm'tten were in not find· 
ina tlie aooe11ant 1 iah 1 e to the resoondents on other grounds, the 
1udgment entered hv the court be 1 ow should be affirmed in all respect 
anrl respondents should be awarderl their costs and attornev's fees 
incurred in this aooea 1 • 
nA~Fn this llth c1av of April, 19R4. 
I 
/ 
\, f/ . i:- --r. -.. ======-===-
foreqoing Prief of Pespon~ents ~1 il 1 iam P~a~ ~oaer~ in~ P~triria f PP 
Pogers to the fo11owino counsel of recorr1 or this 1 't'"i r1av o• Anri i, 
1983. 
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